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This paper presents a model in which anonymous charitable donations are rationalized by two human
tendencies drawn from the psychology literature.  The first is people's disproportionate disposition
to help those they agree with while the second is the dependence of peoples' self-esteem on the extent
to which they perceive that others agree with them. Government spending crowds out the charity that
ensues from these forces only modestly.  Moreover, people's donations tend to rise when others donate.
In some equilibria of the model, poor people give little because they expect donations to come mainly
from richer individuals. In others, donations by poor individuals constitute a large fraction of donations
and this raises the incentive for poor people to donate. The model predicts that, under some circumstances,
charities with identical objectives can differ by obtaining funds from distinct donor groups.  The model
then provides an interpretation for situations in which the number of charities rises while total donations
are stagnant.
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and NBER
jrotemberg@hbs.eduThis paper presents a model that is directed at rationalizing several aspects of charitable
giving. First, individuals do not appear to reduce their contributions to a charity signiﬁcantly
when they learn that the government or other individuals have increased the funds that they
devote to the charity’s beneﬁciaries. Indeed, there are instances in which people increase
their contributions when they hear that others have contributed more. Second, there are
often several distinct charities that contribute to the same beneﬁciaries, and these charities
frequently diﬀer by the donor population to whom they target their appeal. Related to
this, one sometimes observes increases in the number charitable organizations without a
corresponding increase in the contributions relative to income. Lastly, the extent to which
individuals contribute to charity diﬀers greatly, even among countries that appear otherwise
quite similar.
These observations can be rationalized by supposing that people have social preferences
with the properties assumed in Rotemberg (2009). These preferences are based on two
human tendencies detected in the empirical psychology literature. The ﬁrst is that people
are happier when they learn that there is more agreement with their point of view. The
second is that they have warmer feelings towards, and are more willing to help, individuals
whom they perceive as sharing their beliefs or, more generally, individuals who are more
similar to themselves. Rotemberg (2009) captures these properties in a utility function and
shows that, in combination, they can explain why people vote.
Charitable contributions are similar to voting in that they allow people to signal what
they like. People who think a particular charitable cause is worthwhile can signal this
attitude to others by contributing, just like voting for a candidate can signal the belief that
a candidate is suitable for oﬃce. The parallel is in some ways even closer in the sense that
both charitable contributions and voting involve the expression of beliefs about how resources
ought to be distributed to others. These beliefs are often held quite passionately and it may
be particularly important for people to ﬁnd ways to make other people who share these
beliefs feel good about themselves. In the current context, it should lead people who believe
in a charitable cause to gain (vicarious) utility from contributing to this cause because they
1would expect the happiness of other believers to rise when they learn that there are more
people like them.
Consistent with Andreoni (1990), whose model also rationalizes the observation that
government contributions “crowd-out” private donations only modestly, my results hinge
on the supposition that individual utility does not depend only on the public good that
is provided by the charity. The extra utility of giving (or “warm glow” to use Andreoni’s
(1990) phrase) is modeled explicitly as depending on the utility received by others, however.1
The size of this particular beneﬁt from contributions depends on an individual’s assessment
of the number of people who agree with him. If an individual perceives this number to be
larger, he expects more people to gain from learning that an additional person agrees with
them, and his own vicarious beneﬁts from donating rise. This ﬁts broadly with the empirical
evidence suggesting that, all else equal, people are more likely to contribute to a cause if
they expect the cause to have many other supporters.
Democratic voting systems give one vote to each person regardless of income. Charitable
contributions, on the other hand, do vary by income. If preferences do not vary by income,
the standard public goods model of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) predicts this only
too well. Indeed, it predicts that all contributors have the same marginal utility of (and
level) of private consumption, with the rest of income being contributed to charity. On the
other hand, List (2011) shows that, in the U.S, low income donors typically contribute at
least as high a proportion of their income to charity as higher income donors.
In my model, higher income individuals have a related reason to contribute more, namely
that their income makes them willing to pay a higher price to signal that there is an ad-
ditional altruist around. One novel implication of the model, on the other hand, is that
the contributions of poorer individuals tend to be subject to multiple equilibria. Equilibria
where poor individuals do not contribute at all tend to coexist with equilibria in which their
donations constitute the bulk of total contributions. The intuition for this multiplicity is
1Andreoni (1990) refers to the warm glow as an “egoistic” force, in part to contrast this with the altruism
implicit in charitable contributions. In my formalization, there is no particular reason to view one of the
forces that leads to charity to be more oriented towards the ego than the other.
2the following: When only rich people contribute, all individual donations are high so the
cost of signaling that there is an additional altruist is high as well. This tends to deter
contributions form poorer individuals. By contrast, if the bulk of contributions is made by
poor individuals, the typical contribution is small. The cost of signaling that there is an
additional altruist can thus be low enough that poor individuals wish to make contributions.
One attractive aspect of this multiplicity of equilibria is that it may help explain why
the fraction of contributors to charity varies greatly across countries. According to a recent
Gallup survey, 73% of individuals in the United Kingdom donated money to a charitable
organization while only 31% of individuals in France did so.2 This variability may well be
due to sources other than multiple equilibria, though it is worth noting that it is unlikely
to be due exclusively to France having a more extensive welfare state. Contributions are
widespread in many countries with generous public welfare provisions. In the Netherlands,
for example, 77% of individuals contributed to charity according to the same Gallup poll.
This paper is far from the ﬁrst to suggest that gifts and charitable contributions are
related to signaling. However, the important signaling papers of Glazer and Konrad (1996),
B´ enabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannessson (2011) suppose that the indi-
vidual is signaling in a way that makes his own contributions visible. Particularly in the
case of large contributions, many contributions are indeed visible to others.3 My empha-
sis, by contrast, is on contributions whose total is visible to others but whose constituent
individual contributions are not. Examples of such anonymous contributions include those
made via SMS messages. After the Haiti earthquake of 2010, several organizations set up
organization-speciﬁc phone numbers such that dialers to these numbers that texted “HAITI’”
would transfer a ﬁxed sum (most commonly $10) from their account to the organization in
question. The funds raised in this manner were not insubstantial. The American Red Cross
apparently raised $29 million through this scheme.4
2See Charities Aid foundation (2010).
3According to these models this visibility is desired to the donors, who thereby gain the esteem from
others. My model suggests that an alternative is possible, namely that it is the charities that desire this
visibility so that they can use visible donations to obtain contributions from others.
4See Preston and Wallace, 2010.
3Individuals may be able to remember their own contributions, so this still leaves the
possibility that they are signaling to their future selves as in B´ enabou and Tirole (2006).
In their model, individuals value this because they would like to believe themselves to be
generous. This still leaves open the question of what form of “genuine generosity” it is that
people would like to believe themselves to be in possession of. The model in this paper is an
attempt at answering this question.
Because it would be attractive to model genuine generosity in a manner that is consistent
with people’s behavior and attitudes in other domains, I focus on the two psychological forces
mentioned at the start.5 The ﬁrst is people’s tendency to be more helpful to people that
are more similar to them. There are two types of evidence for this. First, there is the
cross-sectional positive correlation between similarity and the extent to which people are
close in social networks, and thus tend to help each other. This correlation has been called
homophily and an extensive literature on it is surveyed by McPherson et al. (2001). Second,
a variety of experiments have sought to vary the extent to which subjects help by changing
the extent to which subjects perceive the target of their helping as similar to themselves.
Recent experiments showing that perceived similarity raises helping include St¨ urmer et al.
(2006) and Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011).6
My analysis is also based on the idea that people’s utility increases when they think
that others agree with them or, in the terminology of Gaillot and Baumeister (2007), when
they view others as validating their worldview. Gaillot and Baumeister (2007) provide cross-
sectional evidence consistent with this: people’s self-esteem appears positively correlated
with the extent to which they say that others agree with them.7 There is also some experi-
mental evidence showing that attempts at changing people’s perception of how much others
5Earlier evidence for these tendencies is discussed in Rotemberg (2009).
6While not involving helping per se, the experiments in Walton et al. (2011) are notable because a very
minimal manipulation of similarity (being mentioned as belonging to a “group”) leads to increased eﬀort in
a task that ﬁts with the group’s name.
7People do not give identical responses when they are asked how satisﬁed they are with themselves than
when they are asked how satisﬁed they are with life as a whole, where the latter is more often used as a
stand-in for happiness. Still the two responses are highly correlated. Indeed. Diener and Diener (1995) show
that life satisfaction is more correlated with this measure of self- esteem than with the other measures of
domain-speciﬁc satisfaction they consider.
4agree with them aﬀect their reported self-esteem. See, in particular, the studies in Pool et
al. (1998) and Kenworthy and Miller (2001).
Pool et al. (1998) shows that the extent to which the opinions held by a group aﬀects an
individual’s self-esteem depends on the nature of the group, with people caring more about
groups that are more similar to themselves. By the same token, individuals’s helpfulness
appears to depend on similarity along a wide variety of dimensions.8 This suggests that,
while donors to a charity care about other donors, the extent to which they care about a
particular group of donors depends on the extent to which this group is similar to them in
other ways. This leads me to analyze whether diﬀerentiated charities arise in equilibrium,
where these charities provide funds to the same beneﬁciaries but specialize in collecting funds
from distinct groups. As an example of this, many churches conduct their own fundraisers
for popular causes. Also, disasters tend to generate fundraising activities by a variety of
organizations, at least some of which cater to relatively narrow clienteles.9
The model predicts that charitable organizations that are diﬀerentiated by donor group
can only arise if people do indeed care less about people outside the group than people
inside the group. Otherwise, there is a force that tends to push towards the existence of
indistinguishable charities. This force is that the typical level of a donation tends to be
diﬀerent in diﬀerentiated charities. For donors that do not distinguish among other donors,
this diﬀerence tends to undermine diﬀerentiation by creating an incentive to donate to those
charities whose contributions are lowest. The paper thus suggests that an increase in the
extent to which people care diﬀerentially about donors of their own groups allows for an
increase in the diﬀerentiation across charities. If this change tastes involves a reduction
in the extent to which people care about out-groups, total contributions can fall even as
diﬀerentiation rises.
This may help provide an interpretation for periods in which contributions stay stagnant
relative to GDP while the number of charitable organizations grows. Data from the IRS
8See Byrne (1967) for a discussion.
9In the case of the Haiti earthquake, for example, an organization of Christian media companies called
National Religious Broadcasters raised SMS funds though a phone number of their own.
5shows that the number of tax exempt organizations grew on average by over 3.05 percent
in the available sample 1991-2010. On the other hand, the Center on Philanthropy (2010)
reports that total charitable giving was the same percent of GDP in 2009 as in 1969. It
should be noted that this percentage grew from 1.7% to 2.2% from 1994 to 1999, when the
number of tax exempt organizations grew relatively rapidly as well. Still, the number of
charities grew by nearly 3% even in the period 1999-2009, when the ratio of giving to GDP
declined slightly. An increase in the number of charities need not indicate an increase in
diﬀerentiation (since the charities that spring up may simply be identical to existing ones).
Nonetheless, a model that allows the number of diﬀerentiated charities to grow without
leading to growth in contributions might be valuable in interpreting these trends.10
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the public goods approach
to charity, not only to recapitulate the weaknesses stressed by Sugden (1982) and Andreoni
(1988) but also to lay the foundations for the behavioral assumptions added in Section 2.
With these assumptions, government spending causes a smaller crowding out than in the
public goods case. Moreover, people may respond to news of more contributions by increasing
their own donations. Section 3 starts the analysis of the case where people also belong to one
of two groups that diﬀer in other ways. Section 4 presents equilibria in which the two groups
contribute to distinct charities. The following section studies the inference problem faced by
individuals when there is only one set of indistinguishable charities while section 6 presents
the resulting equilibria. Section 7 compares outcomes with indistinguishable charities to
outcomes where these cater to diﬀerent types of donors. Section 8 concludes.
1 Background: The standard public goods case
There are N individuals, of which m of belong to a subset A and sympathize with the
beneﬁciaries of a charity. The rest are selﬁsh. All individuals have pre-tax income I, pay
10In tackling the question of what determines the equilibrium number of charities, this paper is related
to Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Aldashev and Verdier (2010). None of these
papers focuses on forces that can potentially increase the number of charities without raising charitable
contributions, however.
6taxes t and can spend their after-tax income on either privately consumed goods or on
charity. Individual i’s expenditures on the former are denoted by xi while those on the latter
are denoted by gi. Individual i’s budget constraint is thus
xi + gi = I − t: (1)
The taxes t are used to support the charity’s beneﬁciaries, so the total funds received by
these beneﬁciaries equals
G = tN +
∑
j
gj ≡ G−i + gi; (2)
where the second equality serves to deﬁne G−i, the amount received by the beneﬁciaries from
all sources other than i’s voluntary contributions.
The utility function of selﬁsh individuals just depends on their private consumption so
that they set xi = I − t. Altruists, on the other hand, have payoﬀs that depend on the
welfare of the beneﬁciaries so that, as in the standard public goods analysis of charitable
contributions of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), their utility depends on G. For
simplicity, I consider a particular functional form that relates the “material payoﬀs” Pi to
xi and G, namely
Pi = log(xi) + v log(G): (3)
Preferences with this functional form have been used before in the literature, particularly by
Andreoni (1990). Using (1) and (2), these payoﬀs can be written as
Pi = log(I − t − gi) + v log(G−i + gi) (4)
The ﬁrst order condition for maximizing Pi with strictly positive gi is
−
1







v(I − t) − G−i
1 + v
(6)
7Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which people all know G−i and set gi optimally. At
this equilibrium, all gi must equal a common value g so that G equals (gm+tN). Using the
ﬁrst order condition (5), this symmetric equilibrium satisﬁes
g =
vI − (v + N)t
v + m
: (7)
Total private giving to charity equals mg so that, using (7), the total received by the charity’s
recipients equals
G =
mvI + (N − m)t
v + m
: (8)
When m = N so that everyone is an altruist, an increase in t has no eﬀect on G. This
is Warr’s (1982) neutrality result and follows from the ability of altruistic individuals to
reestablish the conditions equating the marginal utility of spending on private and public
goods by fully oﬀsetting the government’s transfers to charity. When m < N, the taxation of
people who do not contribute voluntarily increases the total funds available to the charity as
in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). The total increase in G is smaller than the increase
in the involuntary contributions of selﬁsh individuals (N −m)t, however. The reason is that
altruists respond by curtailing their own contributions by even more than the tax that is
levied on them.
As shown in (7), altruists also reduce their own contribution g when the number of
altruists m is higher. As far as an altruistic individual i is concerned, the only eﬀect of
adding additional altruists is to increase G−i. Equation (6) then implies that gi falls. As
emphasized by Sugden (1982), this eﬀect is likely to be substantial. If one supposes that the
slope of individual giving with respect to after tax income is between .02 and .04 percent,
which seems realistic for the U.S., v is also between .02 and .04. A one dollar increase in the
charity’s resources from other sources should lead individual i to reduce his own contribution
by 1=(1+v), that is between 96 and 98 cents. This unappealing result comes about because a
one dollar increase in G−i is seen by someone who is altruistic towards the charity’s recipients
as equivalent to having received a dollar of income and having spent that dollar of income
on the charity. The person’s reaction, then, is to reduce his gifts to charity so that the total
8increase in the charity’s resources are between .02 and .04.
2 Adding self-esteem and altruism for contributors to
the standard model
The ﬁrst modiﬁcation introduced in this section is to let the utility function of altruists
depend on their expectation of the number of people who share their altruism. For this to
aﬀect charitable contributions, it is important that people do not know m in advance, so
that they use the observed level of G−i to make inferences about m.
For an individual i belonging to A, let Di represent his individualistic payoﬀs, i.e., the
payoﬀs that do not depend on the payoﬀs of others. Since the number of people who agree
with this individual equals m − 1, we have
Di = Pi + wEi(m − 1); (9)
where Ei is the operator that takes expectations based on i’s information. The linearity of
Di in Ei(m−1) turns out to be very convenient in the case of multiple types studied below.
In addition, the utility of each member of A depends on the payoﬀs of the other members.
Letting the parameter a capture the intensity of this altruism for other altruists, we have







Since altruists expect other altruists to be identical, altruist i each expects all others to
have the same private consumption xj and the same expectation regarding (m−1), Ej(m−1).
Using (3), (9) in (10), the utility of altruist i is thus
Ui = log(xi)+Ei(m−1)log(xj)+v[1+aEi(m−1)]log(G)+wEi(m−1)[1+aEi(Ej(m−1))]
(11)
I focus on symmetric rational expectations equilibria at which each individual i sets gi
optimally while having correct beliefs about G, t, N, and g, the equilibrium contributions
9of other altruists.11 As a result, any altruist i’s belief concerning m satisﬁes




By the same token, i’s expectation of Ej(m − 1) when j is any altruist diﬀerent from i is
Ei(Ej(m − 1)) =
G−i + gi − g − tN
g
: (13)
This diﬀers from Ei(m − 1) because i realizes that he can aﬀect G−j by changing gi. Using
(12) and (13) in (11), the utility of altruist i conditional on G−i is



















Using (1) to substitute for xi in this equation, the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal
(interior) level of gi is
−
1











g2 = 0: (15)
As required by the second order condition, the derivative of this equation with respect


















In the standard case considered in the previous section, the parameters a and w are zero,
so this expression is negative. It then follows that, as discussed above, gi falls when G−i
rises. At the opposite extreme, when a and w are positive while v is negligible, so that the
predominant source of donations is the desire to raise the self-esteem of people who share
one’s altruism, (16) is positive so that gi rises with G−i. An increase in G−i signals that
there are more members of A so that increases in gi raise the self-esteem of more people.
11While consistent with rational expectations, the assumption that people know g in equilibrium is a
strong one. In a more realistic setting, people would have some information about this, but the information
would be poorer. The essential feature of the model, namely that G i conveys information about m should
be preserved even if in such a setting, however.
10To understand in more detail the conditions under which an increase in G−i raises gi,
it is worth computing the symmetric equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, each individual
contribution gi must equal the common belief about the contributions of others g. Therefore,
gi = g = (G−i − tN)=(m − 1). Using this in (15), this equilibrium satisﬁes
F ≡
−1
I − t − g
+ v
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+ (m − 1)aw (18)
As in the standard analysis discussed earlier, increases in m, the number of contributors
to public goods, lower individual contributions when w = 0. This is true even if a > 0 so
that an increase in other’s donations signals to all altruists that they should obtain a larger
vicarious utility gain from an increase in G. Even with a > 0, the main eﬀect of an increase
in m is to raise G and lower the marginal utility of donating.
The result that g falls when m rises can be overturned if in addition to a being positive,
w is large relative to v. Since g is strictly increasing in   and depends on m only through  ,










Notice that this condition turns out to be easier to meet as m and a grow. A reduction in
a implies that altruists care less about the self-esteem of other altruists, so that it pushes in
the same direction as a reduction in w. An increase in m, by contrast, raises the number of
people whose self-esteem is aﬀected by increasing gi and thus acts in a way that is similar
to an increase in w. The role of m in this model might seem problematic because (18)
implies that, as m rises without bound, g becomes arbitrarily close to I so that people give
almost all their income to charity. It is important to stress, however, that the analysis has
been conducted for a ﬁxed population N, and m cannot be larger than this. Moreover,
the parameter w may well depend on N itself. If, for example, self-esteem depends on the
11fraction of individuals that share one’s views rather than on their absolute number, w would
be inversely proportional to N. In that case,   would not rise with the total population N,
though it would still be increasing in m for given N if (19) were satisﬁed.
Interestingly, condition (19) also ensures that gi is increasing in G−i. To see this, it
suﬃces to notice that, when t = 0, the expression in (16) equals 1=g2 times the leftmost
expression (19). Since a positive value of the expression in (16) leads gi to be increasing in
G−i, the conclusion follows.
Three diﬀerent ﬁeld experiments suggest that increases in m and G−i raise gi. The
most direct evidence is in Frey and Meier (2004) who selectively provided information to
students in Zurich about past contributions. When the data they provided suggested that
past contributions had been widespread, individual were more likely to contribute than
when they provided no such data. The contribution rate fell further when they provided
information suggesting that past participation was low. Similarly, List and Lucking-Reiley
(2002) show that contributions rise when more “seed money” is available for the purchase
of a university computer. Finally, Shang and Croson (2009) manipulate how public radio
volunteers respond to incoming calls wishing to make a donation. They ﬁnd that these
donors make larger contributions if they are told that someone else has given more.
This observed complementarity between donations and expectations of other’s donations
contradicts the standard model described earlier (which implies that these variables are
substitutes).12 It also contradicts the version of Andreoni’s (1990) “warm glow” model
where the beneﬁts of donations are “purely egoistic” in that individuals derive utility only
from their own donations and not from G. The reason is that, in this case, G−i should exert
no inﬂuence on gi. As demonstrated by Romano and Yildirim (2001), a “mixed” model
where i’s utility depends on both his own donation gi and on total donations G need no be
inconsistent with a positive response of gi to G−i. What is necessary for this to be the case,
however, is that second partial derivatives satisfy certain properties. In the case where the
12It may be consistent, however, with a public goods model which includes asymmetric information, as in
Vesterlund (2003).
12utility function is separable in private goods, what is needed is that the derivative of utility
with respect to gi (the ”warm glow eﬀect”) be larger when total donations are higher. It is
not immediately apparent when utility functions should be expected to have this property,
however, so that the current paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a psychological
foundation for this feature.
I now proceed to study the extent to which an increase in taxes t that is matched by
increased government expenditures on G leads to declines in individual contributions. Dif-





















Both −dF=dt and −dF=dg are positive. When w = 0, so that self-esteem considerations
are absent, the former is strictly larger than the latter because N exceeds m. Thus a one
dollar increase in taxes leads contributors to lower their contributions by more than one
dollar. This result also obtained when both a and w were zero, so this shows that altruism
among members of A is not suﬃcient to overturn this result. If, however, w and a are both
positive, it becomes possible for dF=dg to exceed dF=dt so that dg=dt is smaller than one in
absolute value.
For given w, a and n, the absolute value of dg=dt shrinks together with v. For illustrative
purposes it is thus useful to study the limit where v is negligible. At that point, (17) simpliﬁes
so that the equilibrium value of g is given by
g =
wa(m − 1)
1 + wa(m − 1)
(I − t): (21)
A one dollar increase in t thus has the same eﬀect on the contributions of members of A
as a one dollar reduction in I. If individuals contributions rise by 2 to 4 cents with a one
dollar increase in income, this reduction in contributions is negligible. Total crowding out
is smaller still since a one dollar increase in taxes raises total revenue by N dollars of which
only m ∗ dg=dI are crowded out. If the fraction of contributors m=N is 70 percent, total
crowding out is between 1.5 and 3 cents per dollar.
13A rich empirical literature has sought to determine the extent to which government
transfers to charities crowd out private donations. The estimates range widely, though
relatively few studies ﬁnd the nearly complete crowd out predicted by the model when w is
set to zero. What we just established is that much lower levels of crowding out, even the
negligible crowd-out found by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), can be rationalized if one is willing
to reduce v and increase w.
3 A model with two types
From now on, I let the population contain two types of individuals H and L, where these
types can potentially diﬀer in their income, in the fraction of altruists within each type, and
in the tastes of the altruists of each type. As a result, the voluntary contributions of altruists
of type H, gH will generally diﬀer in equilibrium from gL, the voluntary contributions of
altruists of type L.
Let the NH individuals who belong to the set H have income IH while the NL individuals
who belong to set L have income IL with IH ≥ IL. The tastes of altruists of type H can
in principle diﬀer from those of altruists of type L, though I mostly study special cases in
which the tastes are the same.




i = log(xi) + v
 log(G) r = H;L: (22)
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so that the self-esteem of an altruist of type  can depend diﬀerentially on their expectations
of the number of altruists of type H and the number of altruists of type L. Lastly, equation



























; ;! = H;L;  ̸= ! (24)
14so that an altruist of type  can care diﬀerentially for altruists of types H and L.
The maximization of U
i can be simpliﬁed somewhat by noting that individual i expects
all the altruists of the same type to choose the same level of x, x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;! = H;L; ̸= !;j ̸= i (25)
The terms inside curly brackets depend exclusively on factors that are outside i’s control. It
is thus helpful to deﬁne ˜ U
i as being equal to U
i after subtracting the terms in curly brackets.
If H and L have the same tastes, both vH and vL should equal a common value v, a
and w should be independent of  and both a! and w! for  ̸= ! should not depend on
whether H equals  or !. In an even more special case, individuals do not pay attention to
the question of whether another person is of type H or L so that a! and w! equal a and
w respectively. Given the evidence discussed in the introduction, it seems reasonable to
suppose that people of type  care more about people of type  than they care about people
of the other type. The diﬀerential caring for one’s own type then implies that, when  ̸= !,
a > a! and w > w!.
Taking his budget constraint and G
−i as given, individual i of type ’s gain from a small




















































;! = H;L;  ̸= !; j ̸= i:
(26)
In the equilibria I consider, individuals pick g
i optimally so that (26) equals zero if
g
i is positive while (26) is nonpositive if g
i is zero. It turns out that two diﬀerent kinds
of equilibria are possible. I start with the simplest, namely ones where the two types of
15altruists make contributions to observably distinct charities. After studying the conditions
under which such separating equilibria are possible, I turn my attention to equilibria where
all charities are indistinguishable.
4 Equilibria with contributions to distinct charities
If altruists of type H contribute to diﬀerent charities than altruists of type L, charities are
distinguished by type, and I let G denote the total contribution to charities that cater
to individuals of type . I consider rational expectations equilibria in which each agent i
has correct beliefs about the total amount contributed to both charities by people other
than himself, where these amounts equal G minus his own contributions, and I denote
these amounts by G
−i. Each agent also has correct beliefs about g, the amount that other
altruists of type  contribute to charity  in equilibrium. Given these beliefs’ i’s expectations












g! ;! = L;H  ̸= !: (27)
Each type of altruist can in principle contribute to either type of charity. At a separating
equilibrium of the sort considered here, however, an altruist of type  contributes only to
charities of type  so that dg
i in (26) raises only G. Using (27), equation (26) implies that
the resulting beneﬁts of increasing g





























; ;! = L;H  ̸= !:
At a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium in which both gH and gL are positive, these
expressions must equal zero while g
i must equal to g and G must equals gm. Therefore,
−
1
I − g +
[
v(1 + a(m − 1)) + v!a!m!
mg + m!g! +




;! = H;L;  ̸= !:
Notice that, at a separating equilibrium with g > 0 the equations in (27) allow altruists
to infer m without error. The conditions in (28) are necessary for a such an equilibrium,
and turn out to be easily met:
16Proposition 1. There exists a pair of values gL and gH with 0 < g < I that solve (28).
Proof. For ﬁxed g! > 0, the limit of the left hand side of (28) when g goes to zero from
above is plus inﬁnity while the limit when it goes to I from below is minus inﬁnity. There
is thus a zero between 0 and I for every positive g!.
This establishes that one can ﬁnd a pair of values gL and gH that satisfy these necessary
conditions. For this pair to be an actual equilibrium, altruists of type  must not wish to
deviate by contributing to the charity that receives funds from altruists of type ! where
! ̸= . Since (28) ensures that altruists of type  are indiﬀerent to a small change in G that
is ﬁnanced by an oﬀsetting change in x
i, this is equivalent to requiring that altruists of type
 not be willing to reduce G by dgi while raising G! by the same amount. According to
(27), this deviation would raise all other individual’s estimate of m! by dgi=g! while lowering
their estimate of m by dgi=g. As a result, (25) implies that these deviations would raise







































This leads to two conclusions:
Proposition 2. If vL = vH aLL = aLH = aHL = aHH and wLL = wLH = wHL = wHH while
IH > IL, no separating equilibrium exists.
Proof. Setting a ≡ aLL = aLH = aHL = aHH and w ≡ wLL = wLH = wHL = wHH, (30)
implies that a separating equilibrium exists only if gL ≥ gH. On the other hand, inspection
of (28) under the conditions of the proposition implies that the numerators of the terms in
square brackets are independent of  so that, given that IH > IL, gH > gL
Proposition 3. As long as m > 1 while I, aHH, aLL, wHH and wLL are strictly greater
than zero, a separating equilibrium exists if aLH, aHL, wLH and wHL are low enough.
17Proof. If m > 1 while I, aHH, aLL, wHH and wLL are positive, the values of gL and gH
that solve (28) are strictly positive even if aLH, aHL, wLH and wHL are all set arbitrarily
close to zero. At the same time, the positive terms of (29) and (30) are arbitrarily small for
arbitrarily low values of aLH, aHL, wLH and wHL so that, for these values, both inequalities
are violated.
Together, these propositions establish that situations where all altruists care identically
about each other are inconsistent with the existence of separate charities that cater to the
two types. If, at the opposite extreme, altruists of type  care almost exclusively about
altruists of their own type and have have self-esteem that is depends almost exclusively
on the attitudes of people of their own type, type-speciﬁc charities arise. For a tightly
parameterized example, Proposition 9 below presents a more continuous version of this result,
so that smooth reductions in the degree to which altruists care about people of the other
type make it easier to sustain a separating equilibrium.
An extreme special case that is particularly revealing involves the limit when vL and vH
go to zero while aHL = aLH = wHL = wLH = 0, so that altruists of type  care only about
other altruists of type . Proposition 3 implies that a separating equilibrium exists while




1 + aw(m − 1)
:
,
This shows that, as one might expect, contributions rise with altruism a, the eﬀect of
agreement on self-esteem w, and the number of altruists of type , m. It also shows that,
if all types have the same tastes (as deﬁned by a and w) and their altruists are equally
numerous, the type whose I is higher also has higher private consumption I − g. The
reason for this is that increases in I raise individual contributions g and this raises the cost
of signaling that there is one additional individual of type . This prompts individuals to
shift resources from contributions towards private consumption. The model is thus consistent
with the coexistence of positive charitable contributions by lower income individuals and a
18strictly positive correlation of individual income and consumption.
5 Expectations of m when charities are indistinguish-
able
I now turn to the case where charities are indistinguishable. The ﬁrst issue that arises in
this case is how people make inferences about the two m’s, now that they only observe the
total level of contributions. As before, I assume that individuals have correct beliefs about
gH and gL, the equilibrium contributions made by other people of the two types. While this
helps altruists obtain estimates of the expected values of mL and mH, these estimates will
now generally diﬀer from the realized values of these variables.
In calculating these expectations, I neglect integer constraints and suppose that every
individual’s prior distribution for m is uniformly distributed between 0 and N. Conditional
on being an altruist of type , an individual’s subjective distribution of m is thus uniform
between 1 and N so that it has a mean of 1 + (N − 1)=2. As long as the origin of the
y-axis is interpreted to start at 1, the box depicted in Figure 1 gives the ex ante range of all
possible values of mL and mH for an individual of type L. All the combinations inside this
box satisfy 1 ≤ mL ≤ NL and 0 ≤ mH ≤ NH and are ex ante equally likely.
The knowledge of total contributions by others, G
i then limits the possible values of mH,
mL, or both. To see this, focus ﬁrst on an individual i of type L. This individual knows that









−i < NHgH, this individual perceives that the maximum possible value for mH is
smaller than NH. If this inequality is reversed, this individual cannot rule out the possibility
that mH is equal to NH. In this case, his perception regarding the minimum value of mL is
that it is strictly larger than one (because even if mH = NH other individuals of type L must
be making voluntary contributions). Similarly, if GL
−i < (NL − 1)gL, i views the maximum
possible value of mL to be lower than NL. If, instead, this latter inequality is reversed, mL
19can equal NL while the minimum value of mH is above zero. Thus, depending on whether
GL
−i is above or below NHgH and (NL −1)gL, we obtain four qualitatively diﬀerent kinds of
outcomes. These are depicted in Figures 1-4.
First, suppose that, as in Figure 1, (NL − 1)gL is smaller than GL
−i, which is in turn
smaller than NHgH. Aside from satisfying (31), the feasible m’s must remain inside the box
that satisﬁes 1 ≤ mL ≤ NL and 0 ≤ mH ≤ NH. The result is that the m combinations that
an altruist of type L sees as possible after observing GL
−i lie on the line between the points
{(GL
−i−(NL−1)gL)=gH;NL} and {GL
−i=gH;0}. Since all these combinations are equally likely,
the posterior distribution of mH is uniformly distributed between (GL
−i − (NL − 1)gL)=gH
and GL
−i=gH while that of mL remains uniformly distributed between 1 and NL. As a result,
small changes in GL
−i have no eﬀect on the posterior distribution of mL. This result is obvious
when gL equals zero, and its extension to the case where gL is “small” obtains here under
special assumptions. Still, there is a simple intuition that is associated with this result and
it suggests that it might be valid more generally. This intuition is that GL
−i contains very
little information about the range of the possible values of mL when NL and gL are small
enough that the level of contributions is consistent with both mL = 0 and mL = NL.
Figure 2 shows that altruists reach analogous inferences when NHgH is smaller than GL
−i,
which is smaller than (NL−1)gL. In this case, their conclusion from GL
−i is that mH remains
uniformly distributed between 0 and NH while (mL − 1) is uniformly distributed between
(GL
−i − nHgH)=gL and GL
−i=gL.
Figure 3 turns to the case where GL
−i is smaller than both (NL − 1)gL and NHgH.
Individual i then perceives that mL can be between 1 and 1 + GL
−i=gL, while mH can be
between 0 and GL
−i=gH. Given that all the values inside the box bordered by mH = NH and
mL = NL were equally likely ex ante, and that the individuals knows that (31) must hold,
all the outcomes on the line between {1;1 + GL
−i=gL and {GL
−i=gH;0} are equally likely ex
post. As a result, the posterior distribution of mH is uniformly distributed between 0 and
GL
−i=gH while that of mL is uniformly distributed between 1 and 1 + GL
−i=gL.
The leaves the last qualitative outcome, which arises when GL
−i is larger than both NHgH
20and (NL − 1)gL. The result is depicted in Figure 4. The m’s that are consistent with
i’s information lie once again at the intersection of the line between {0;1 + GL
−i=gL} and
{GL
−i=gH;0} and the subset of the plane given by 1 ≤ mL ≤ NL and 0 ≤ mH ≤ NH.
Since these combinations of m are all equally likely, the posterior distribution of mH is
uniform between (GL
−i − (NL − 1)gL)=gH and NH while that of mL is uniform between
(GL
−i − NHgH)=gL and NL.
Using (31), it is apparent that whether GL
−i is greater than or smaller than NHgH hinges
on the relationship between gL=gH and (NH −mH)=(mL −1) while the question of whether
GL
−i is greater or smaller than (NL − 1)gL hinges on the relationship between gL=gH and
mH=(NL − mL). If, in particular, gL=gH is smaller than both these critical values, Figure
1 applies, while Figure 3 is relevant when it is larger than both. If gL=gH is smaller than
(NH − mH)=(mL − 1) and larger than mH=(NL − mL), the situation is described by Figure
3, while Figure 4 applies if gL=gH is smaller than the latter and larger than the former. The























































i (mH) = NH
2 :
(32)
The analysis for an altruist of type H is quite similar, though not identical. One obvious
diﬀerence is that, if the equilibrium value of gH diﬀers from that of gL, the equilibrium value
of GH
−i diﬀers from that GL
−i. A related diﬀerence is that an altruist of type H realizes that
mH equals at least 1, whereas an altruist of type L does not know this. The result is that,
for H, the formulas governing inference depend on whether GH
−i is greater or less than NLgL
and (NH − 1)gH. Still, an analysis along the lines of the one above establishes that this
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i (mH − 1) = NH−1
2 :
(33)
The equilibrium depends, once again, on the eﬀect of changes in individual contributions
on the perceived number of altruists. Regardless of whether an individual i is of type L or
H, an increase in his own contribution gi by one dollar raises the G
j of all other agents by
one dollar. At the boundary values of (32) and (33), the change in the perceived values of
mH and mL is diﬀerent for altruists of the two types. However, the eﬀect is the same in the


































































for  and ! equal to H or L, where j must diﬀer from i when ! = .
One notable aspect of (34) is that the second and third lines are identical. Thus, the
derivatives of beliefs about the m’s with respect to total contributions when gL=gH takes on
“intermediate” values does not depend on whether mH=(NL−mL) is smaller than or greater











NL < 1: (35)
With mH=NH and mL=NL having a standard uniform distribution and both NL and NH
ﬁxed, this inequality is satisﬁed for one half of all possible realizations of mH and mL.
Because the case where this inequality holds is so similar to the case where it does not, I
carry out the analysis only for one case, namely the case where it holds.
226 Equilibria with heterogeneous gifts to an indistin-
guishable set of charities
In this section, I construct equilibria in which the two altruistic types donate diﬀerent
amounts to charities that are indistinguishable from one another, so that they can be treated
as being the same. One of the key conclusions of this section is that equilibria with diﬀerent
values of gL can coexist for certain parameters and income levels. The reason is that, as
demonstrated by (34), small changes in the volume of charitable contributions are interpreted
diﬀerently for diﬀerent values of gL.
Rather than computing the equilibrium value(s) of gL and gH for given parameters and
income levels, it turns out to be easier to start from a value of gL=gH and compute the value
of IL=IH that leads this ratio gL=gH to be an equilibrium. As a byproduct, the analysis
also yields the resulting equilibrium value of gH=IH. When proceeding in this manner, (34)
implies that the formulas for IL=IH are diﬀerent depending on the relationship between
gL=gH and the two critical values. I start by considering the case where gL=gH is smaller
than both, then move to the case where it is between the two and end with the case where
it is larger than both.
When gL=gH is below both critical values, agent’s expectations obey the ﬁrst lines of
(32), (33), and (34). I further assume, for simplicity:
Assumption A Individuals i believes that, regardless of the level of his donations, any
change in his donations will lead others to change their beliefs about the m’s according to
(34).
This assumption about beliefs corresponds to the actual eﬀect of individual donations
under two conditions. The ﬁrst is that individual’s income is negligible relative to G, which
requires that the N’s be large. This implies that the region in which G
−j ﬁnds itself within
(34) is not aﬀected by i’s contribution. The second is individual donations are necessarily
treated as being given to the indistinguishable set of charities; the individual is unable to
require that his donations be directed at a “diﬀerent” one.






































 represents an altruist of type ’s ex ante expectation of how many other altruists
of type L there are. It equals NL=2 for altruists of type H and (NL − 1)=2 for altruists of
type L. Under the assumption that the individual believes that (34) describes the changes
in other agent’s beliefs regardless of the individual’s own contribution, he will not deviate
from a situation where (36) is non-positive. As a result, situations where these equations
hold as equalities for  equal to both H and L with g
i = g constitute symmetric rational
expectations equilibria. We thus have,
Proposition 4. Supposing Assumption A holds, a rational expectations equilibrium with







































































Proof. Because assumption A holds and the optimization problem of individuals satisﬁes
the second order conditions, an equilibrium requires only that individuals not gain anything
from changing their donations slightly. If gL were exogenous, one could thus obtain the
24equilibrium level of gH by taking (36) for  = H and equating it to zero after substituting
gH for gH
i and gH(mH − 1) + gLmL for GH
−i. The result is that gH must satisfy (38).
For altruists of type L to ﬁnd it optimal to set gL
i equals to r times this value of gH when
other altruists of type L are giving rgH, it must be the case that the expression in (36) for
 = L is zero at this point. This requires that
−
−1




which is satisﬁed when IL satisﬁes (37).
The income ratio IL=IH that solves (37) for r = 0 leads to an equilibrium in which
altruists of type L are indiﬀerent between keeping their contributions at zero and increasing
them slightly. This income ration turns out to play an important role. In particular,






B(0)(1 +  H
B(0))
(39)
there exists an equilibrium with gL = 0 and gH =  H
B(0)=(1 +  H
B(0)).
Proof. At gL = 0, and gH =  H
B(0)=(1 +  H
B(0)), the beneﬁts of increasing gL
i slightly
captured in (26) for  = L are zero when (39) holds as an equality. Equation (26) implies
that lowering IL while keeping gH and gL constant reduces d˜ U
i =dg
i . As a result, lower
levels of IL=IH coupled with a constant gH=IH, lead d˜ U
i =dg
i to be negative when gL equals
zero.
In the standard public goods case the a’s or the w’s are zero, so that condition (39) is valid
when IL is below (vH=vL)mHIH=(vH +mH). Since (IH −gH) equals mHIH=(vH +mH), this
says that IL must equal at least the private consumption of altruists of type H if vH equals
vL. In practice, of course, many individuals with relatively low incomes give to charity even
when their income is much smaller than the private consumption of donors whose income
is higher. In the standard public goods analysis, this would be possible only if these lower
25income individuals cared more for G than their richer counterparts, so that vL > vH. As
already discussed above, this condition is not necessary for the more general preferences
considered here. Still, there is still a minimum level of IL such that, for lower levels of
income, there exists an equilibrium with gL = 0.
As the ratio gL=gH is raised above zero, it goes from being smaller than both (NH −
mH)=mL and mH=(NL − mL) to being greater than these terms. When this ratio is larger
than both, we ﬁnd ourselves in the case described in the last line of (34). As discussed above,
whether intermediate values of gL=gH lead to the second or third line of (34) depends on
whether (NH − mH)=mL is larger than mH=(NL − mL) or not. I focus on the case where it
is. It is then possible for gL=gH to be strictly between mH=(NL −mL) and (NH −mH)=mL
so that G is smaller than both NLgL and NHgH and it is apparent to everyone that there
exist non-contributors of both types.
Agent’s expectations then obey the second lines of (32), (33), and (34). Using these








































Using the same arguments used to prove Proposition 4, we then have:



































































Supposing Assumption A holds, an equilibrium with gL=gH = r exists as long as r0 < r <























I now demonstrate that a pooling equilibrium of the kind described in Proposition 6 can
exist even when there also exists an equilibrium in which one of the two types does not
contribute to charity. To do this, it is necessary to show that IL=IH can satisfy (41) for an
r between r0 and r1 while also satisfying (39). These equations would be incompatible if
 
M(r) were equal to  
B(r), both of whom are measures of the marginal beneﬁt of giving an
additional gH dollars to charity. There are reasons, however, for  L
M(r) to be greater than
 L
M(r) when r > r0. The ﬁrst of these is that, once r exceeds r0, additional donations raise
people’s estimates of mL, and this is more valuable to altruists of type L if aLL exceeds aLH
and wLL exceeds wLH. The second is that, if r is lower than one, the cost of signaling that
there is an additional altruist in the population can be lower when r exceeds r0. This cost
equals (1=2gH)(1 + 1=r) whereas it equals 1=gH when r is smaller than r0 (including when
r = 0).
To illustrate the importance of these forces, I now focus on a special case in which every
altruist cares about every other altruist equally. We then have:
Proposition 7. Suppose that a = aHH = aHL = aLL = aLH and w = wHH = wHL = wLL =
wLH and that both vL and vH are negligible. For a ﬁxed realization of mH and mL, and as
long as awmH < 2, one can ﬁnd values of NL and NH large enough that IL=IH satisﬁes
both (39) and (41) for an r > r0.
Proof. Using the assumed properties of the a’s, the w’s and the v’s, condition (39) becomes
IL
IH <
mH + NL=2 − 1
mH + (NL − 1)=2
(
1




where note is taken that R depends on NL. Using the properties of a, w and v in the
27deﬁnitions of  

































The limit of (r) as r goes to zero is zero while its limit as r becomes unboundedly large
is inﬁnite. Thus, r’s can be found such that (r) < R. At these r’s, there is an equilibrium
with an IL=IH satisfying (39) and (41). For given NL, the resulting r might be below r0,
however. Raising NL lowers r0 but also lowers R, thereby requiring yet another reduction
in r. What can be shown, however, is that when NL is large, the IL=IH that is consistent







































for large NL is then awmH=2, while the limit of
 H
M(r0)





is zero. The limit of (r0)=R is thus smaller than one as long as awmH < 2. For an r near
this r0 to be an equilibrium for an IL=IH below R, it must also be the case that this r0 is
below r1: For any r0, this can be achieved by raising NH.
The reason high values of NL help bring about these multiple equilibria is that they lead
the observed value of G together with low values of gL to be inconsistent with the possibility
that all NL individuals of type L have made contributions. Such a low gL implies that the
cost of signaling that there is an additional altruist is low, and this induces contributions
28from altruists of type L even if their income IL is quite low. At the same time, this low level
of income would lead altruists of type L not to contribute if everyone expected only people
of type H to contribute. In that case, altruists of type L would set gL = 0 because the cost
of signaling that there is an additional altruist would equal gH, and would be high.
To complete the analysis, I now brieﬂy consider the case where gL=gH is greater than the
maximum of (NH − mH)=(mL − 1) and mH=(NL − mL). This maximum can be expected
to be small if NL is large relative to NH. This the case because, across realizations of the
m’s, the mean value of the numerators of both these expressions is NH=2 while that of the
denominators is near NL=2. It follows that the fourth line of (34) is often relevant even for
fairly small values of gL=gH when NL is large relative to NH.




































































The steps used to prove Proposition 4 then also imply that:
Proposition 8. Supposing Assumption A holds, an equilibrium with gL=gH = r > max((NH−











































































Propositions 4, 6, and 8 allow one to compute the ratios IL=IH that lead particular values
of gL=gH to be equilibria, except for those at the boundaries of the regions in (34). For a
particular set of parameters, the results are displayed in Figure 5. This Figure is drawn for
NH, NL, mH and mL equal to 500, 10,000, 100 and 7,000 respectively. In addition, the
taste parameters v, a! and w! for all  and ! including  = ! equal .05, .0001, and .1
respectively. Altruists thus all have the same tastes and do not care whether another person
belongs to H or to L.
Each panel of the ﬁgure has three distinct segments, corresponding to the boundaries
of the regions in (34). Within each segment, IL=IH needs to be higher to rationalize a
higher gL=gH. This is what one would expect since it says that relatively higher donations
by altruists of type L arise when their relative income is higher as well. As gL=gH crosses
from being below mH=(NL − mL) to being above, however, the income ratio IL=IH that
rationalizes this increase in relative donations falls. As discussed earlier, this is because
increases in G have a larger impact on the perceived number of altruists after gL=gH crosses
this boundary. This, in turn, is due to two factors operating in combination. The ﬁrst is
that type L altruists now donate enough that it is no longer possible for all of them to be
altruists. Therefore, increases in G suggest that there are more of them. At the same time,
gL=gH < 1 so, in eﬀect, the cost of signaling that there is an additional altruist is lower: it
falls from gH to an average of gH and gL.
Interestingly, there is a further drop in this cost as gL=gH rises from being smaller than
(NH − mH)=mL to being above. The reason is that, given that (35) holds, higher values of
gL imply that increases in G no longer aﬀects the posterior distribution of mH. The cost
of signaling that there is an additional altruists therefore becomes gL rather than being an
average of gL and gH . Since gL remains below gH, the incentive to donate increases. The
result is that there are three equilibria for IL=IH between about .58 and .72. The ﬁrst is the
equilibrium with gL = 0. The next has gL=gH between the two thresholds in (34), while the
30last has gL=gH above both. Transitions between these equilibria might be interpretable as
involving diﬀerent marketing messages. To leave the equilibrium with gL = 0 and reach the
one between thresholds, it may be suﬃcient to convince altruists of type L that even small
donations make a diﬀerence. By contrast, to transition to the one with the highest gL=gH,
it might make sense to limit the minimum donation that charities accept.
As the second panel of the ﬁgure shows, total charity revenue rises as one goes from
equilibria with lower values of gL=gH to ones with higher ones. This is not only because this
increase is associated with an increase in the donations of altruists of type L. Rather, the
last panel shows that the donations of altruists of type H rise as well. The reason is that, as
already discussed, the equilibria with higher levels of gL=gH involve a lower cost of signaling
that there is an additional altruist and this aﬀects altruists of type H as well.
One unappealing aspect of the results in Figure 5 is that the equilibrium levels of gL=gH
in the Figure are much smaller than the corresponding levels of IL=IH. Thus, rich people at
these equilibria contribute a much larger fraction of their income than poorer people. This
follows from the fact that people of the two types see each other as identical, so they must
end up with the same level of private consumption. When people of diﬀerent incomes are
considered, this is mostly counterfactual.
In the context of this model, however, it seems more reasonable to suppose that altruists
of type H have a particular aﬃnity for altruists of type H, and analogously for altruists
of type L. An example of this sort is considered in Figure 6. Most parameters, including
a and w for  equal to L or H are the same as those for Figure 5. The four values
that are diﬀerent are those for a! and w! in the cases where  diﬀers from !. To make
tastes identical in a certain sense, I set aHL = aLH while wHL = wLH and, these equal one
twentieth of aHH and wHH respectively.
The Figure ignores the positive values of gL=gH below mH=(NL − mL) because these
cannot be equilibria unless IL=IH exceeds .49. On the other hand, it shows that equilibria
with higher values of gL=gH emerge when IL=IH is quite low. Most interestingly, many
of the equilibrium values of gL=gH are comparable to those of IL=IH with there being an
31equilibrium in which they are identical when IL=IH equals about .056. This occurs for two
reasons. First, the altruists of type H, who are relatively rich, are no longer so concerned
about the welfare of the poorer altruists of type L, and this signiﬁcantly reduces their
contributions relative to those in Figure 5. Second, because the altruists of type L are so
much more numerous, the incentive to signal altruism remains quite strong for members of
L. The result is that there are equilibria where people with lower income devote a higher
percentage of their income to charity. It follows immediately that the private consumption
of contributors of type H exceeds that of contributors of type L.
7 Moving between pooling and separating equilibria
The ﬁrst question studied in this section is whether, when both kinds of equilibria coexist,
equilibria with indistinguishable charities raise more or less total revenue than equilibria
with distinct charities. One case where the former clearly raise less is when only one type
contributes to the indistinguishable charities. This leads me to consider how easy it is to
“escape” from an equilibrium where only one type contributes. Lastly, I discuss reasons
why the diﬀerentiation among charities might increase without an accompanying increase in
donations
There is a simple, and extreme, case where equilibria of both types exist while the equi-
librium with separate charities raises more revenue. This is the case studied in Proposition
3, where both types care only about the altruism of people of their own type. We then have:
Proposition 9. Suppose that a! = w! = 0 when  diﬀers from !, that vH = vL = 0 and
that the tastes of the two types are identical so that a = a and w = w for both values
of . Then, at every equilibrium in which individuals have access only to indistinguishable
charities, no type expects that their donation would be smaller if they had access to distinct
charities and at least one type expects that they would be larger.
Proof. Equation (28) implies that contributions at separating equilibria satisfy
g
I − g = aw(m
 − 1)  = H;L: (45)
32When charities are indistinguishable, (26) implies that the conditions for altruists of type
 not to wish to increase their contributions take the form
1









For interior equilibria, these have to hold as equalities, and otherwise g = 0. If gL=gH
is either smaller or larger than the two threshold values, dE
j (m)=dg
i equals 0 for one type
and 1=g for the other. The type for which it equals zero contributes nothing, and therefore
expects that it would contribute more if distinct charities were available. The type for which
it equals 1=g satisﬁes
g




so that it expects its contributions to be the same as in (45).
If gL=gH is between the two threshold values, dE
j (m)=dg
i equals 1=2g so that contri-
butions satisfy
g







Since the left hand side is increasing in g, both types expect that their g would be
larger is (45) held.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple: if people gain utility only from signaling
to altruists of their own type, contributing to a joint charity is relatively unattractive because
some of the signal is “wasted” by giving utility to altruists of the other type.
Even in the case where distinct charities collect more funds, it may not be easy to move
from an equilibrium with a single type of charity to one with several. As already seen im-
plicitly in the proof of Proposition 4, this is particularly diﬃcult under assumption A, which
guarantees that all contributions are treated as pertaining to a single set of indistinguishable
charities. The problem extends, however, to situations where Assumption A is violated so
that it is possible for an individual to contribute to a distinct charity. To see this, consider
a situation where only altruists of type H make contributions to a set of indistinguishable
charities, so that altruists of type L would clearly donate more if a distinct charity were
33available. The problem is that a single deviator who contributes to a distinct charity may
be unable to change anyone’s estimate of mL.
This will occur, in particular, if people who observe a positive contributions to an alter-
native charity assume that these contributions come form a single individual while, at the
same time, their prior distribution of mL assigns zero weight to the possibility that mL = 0.
The posterior distribution of mL is then equal to the prior one. What is interesting about
this special case is that the individual who is deviating is conveying his type correctly, as in
the suggestion by Cho and Kreps (1987), and yet the more relevant equilibrium inference,
which concerns the total number of altruists of type L, does not change. 13
What this suggests is that moving from an equilibrium with a single charity to one with
several requires a certain degree of coordination. Charities may achieve this coordination
through marketing messages, though how they accomplish this is left for further research.
It is worth noting that, even when charities do manage to separate by appealing to diﬀerent
segments, revenues do not necessarily rise (as they did in the case considered in Proposition
9.
To demonstrate this, I consider a numerical example. Suppose that both NH and NL
equal 900, while mH and mL equal 500 and 300 respectively. Altruists of type L care only
about altruists of type L with aLL and wLL equal to .1 and .08 respectively while aLH and
wLH equal zero. Similarly, the self-esteem of altruists of type H depends only on their belief
regarding the number of other altruists of type H so that wHH equals .05 and wHL equals
zero. On the other hand, altruists of type H care equally about altruists of type H and L
so that both aHH and aHL equal .001.
Equilibria with gL=gH above mH=(NL − mL) are displayed in Figure 7.14 This example
diﬀers from those in Figures 5 and 6 in that the highest levels of total contributions relative to
IH occur for income ratios IL=IH that lead gL=gH to be between the two thresholds. Focusing
13At the same time, this is a special case and it is equally possible to imagine cases where the demonstration
by one individual that mL ≥ 1 aﬀects the expectation of mL. Indeed, when the prior distribution of m is
uniform between 0 and N, evidence that m ≥ 1 raises the expected value of m from N=2 to (N +1)=2.
14Those with lower gL=gH require substantially larger levels of IL=IH.
34only on this middle region, Figure 8 combines the ﬁrst two panels of Figure 7 to plot total
contributions as a function of IL=IH. It also plots the levels of total contributions that,
for these income ratios, result from the solution to (28). These are equilibria if agents have
access to charities that are distinguishable by type because, at these points, the inequalities
(29) and (30) are violated.
The Figure shows that, for IL=IH between .039 and .0406, the equilibrium with indis-
tinguishable charities collects more donations. Part of what lies behind this example is that
people of type H like to make people of type L happy so they tend to contribute more to
charities that L also contributes to. That is not all, however, because this force also tends to
make equilibria with distinct charities infeasible, and these are viable in this example. One
possible contributor to the ﬁnding that distinct charities collect less revenue is presented in
the second panel in Figure 8. What this Figure shows is that people’s expectation of mL
is high relative to the actual level of mL at the points where the equilibrium with indistin-
guishable charities raises more donations. This high level of donations might thus be due to
a mistake by people of type H, who would donate less if they had the information about mL
that is revealed by equilibria with distinct charities.
The coexistence of a relatively stagnant level of total donations with an increase in
diﬀerentiation across charities can be rationalized in another way, and this is with a decline
in the concern of altruists of any given type for altruists of the other type. This reduction
in inter-group altruism tends to reduce donations for a constant set of charities while, at the
same time, it makes increased diﬀerentiation possible. To see this in a simple case, focus on
the limit where v is zero. Equation (28) then implies that, if an equilibrium with distinct












It follows that these donations fall when either a! or w! decline. This is not surprising
since a decline in either of these parameters signiﬁes that people care less about the altruism
of others and are less concerned about the welfare of others, and these are the forces that I
35have put at the center of my explanation for charitable contributions. At the same time, the
combination of Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that declines a! or w! make it more likely
that an equilibrium with distinct charities exists.
Because these propositions deal only with the extremes where a! and w! are either
negligible or the same as a and w respectively, a more continuous result would seem
desirable. For this purpose, suppose that a and w equal a and w respectively for both
values of  while a! and w! equal a and w respectively for both possible values of 
and !. Thus, both groups have the same tastes and  is a simple measure of how much they
care for one another, with  = 1 signifying that they do not distinguish between types and
 = 0 signifying that they care only about their own type. We then have:
Proposition 10. Let v = 0, a = a, w = w, a! = a and w! = w. For realizations









allows an equilibrium with distinct charities to exist, while any larger  does not. This
smallest root is close to 1 for IL close to IH and becomes smaller as IL=IH falls.
Proof. Under the conditions of the proposition, ˆ   in equation (47) is equal to aw[m(1 +
2) − 1]. Since this is the same for the two types, g is proportional to I. As a result (29)
cannot hold if (30) is violated so that the violation of the latter is necessary and suﬃcient
for an equilibrium with distinct charities to exist. This condition is now
(2m − 1)




This requires that the quadratic expression on the left hand side of (48) be positive,
which is true for  either smaller than the smallest root or larger than the largest root of the
equation. The proposition focuses on the smaller root. This equals (m−1)=m, which is close
to 1, for IL=IH = 1. Moreover, (48) implies that the sum of the roots is (2m−1)=(mIL=IH)
and this must exceed twice the smaller root. Diﬀerentiation of this equation thus implies
that the smallest root declines smoothly as IL=IH declines.
36This proposition shows that smooth declines in , the extent to which altruists care
about people of the other type, eventually make it possible for an equilibrium with distinct
charities to exist. Thus, reductions in inter-group altruism would lead to growth in the
number of distinct charities if, for example, distinct charities were always created when they
were sustainable in equilibrium.
8 Conclusions
This paper has shown that two assumptions grounded in evidence from psychology can help
explain some aspects of charitable giving. Most particularly, the combination of letting
altruism be larger towards like-minded people and having self-esteem depend on the number
of people that agree with oneself is consistent with small reductions in one’s own giving
in response to larger giving by others. Indeed, there are parameters for which the model
predicts that an individual will increase his own giving when others give more. The model
is also able to explain why certain charities attract contributions from people with diﬀerent
income levels even if one does not assume that the underlying other regarding preferences
diﬀer by income class. In particular, the model does not require poor people to be extremely
generous relative to rich people (or rich people to be extremely selﬁsh relative to poor ones)
in order to have both make contributions at the same time.
Having said this, it is important to stress that the paper has not set out to explain all
known puzzles concerning charitable contributions. As it stands, for example, the model
seems unlikely to provide a meaningful account of situations in which people split their
charitable contributions among a number of charities. The reason is that, as in models
where charitable giving is due exclusively to altruism towards recipients, the model predicts
that the marginal utility of giving is independent of the size of the gift. This suggests that
people should concentrate their gifts on charities that give the highest marginal utility of
giving. If several charities provide this same maximal level, the allocation among them is a
matter of indiﬀerence.
To provide a more determinate explanation of people who contribute to multiple char-
37ities, the model would have to be modiﬁed. One possibility along these lines is to try to
model people’s desire to “hedge their bets” when making contributions. To capture this
phenomenon, one would have to take into account people’s uncertainty regarding charities
and people’s fear of regretting their contribution. This is consistent with one important
aspect of charities, namely that measuring their eﬀectiveness is diﬃcult and, partly for this
reason, they ﬁnd themselves frequently embroiled in scandal. When a scandal erupts, con-
tributors can be expected to regret their contributions. A contributor that spreads his gifts
across charities increases the odds of regretting one of his gifts but reduces the size of each
potential regret. Aversion to large regrets would thus incline individuals to spreading out
their donations.
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41Figure 2: Inferences about mL and mH when NHgH < GL

















42Figure 3: Inferences about mL and mH when GL















43Figure 4: Inferences about mL and mH when GL














44Figure 5: Contributions to indistinguishable charities in an example where altruists do not
distinguish between H and L




































45Figure 6: Contributions to indistinguishable charities in an example where altruists distin-
guish between H and L


































46Figure 7: Contributions to indistinguishable charities in an example with asymmetric tastes




































47Figure 8: Distinct versus indistinguishable charities in an example with asymmetric tastes
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